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Where Lawfare Meets Lawsuit in the Case of  
Padilla v. Yoo 
Joseph Marchesano† 
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high 
virtues of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of neces-
sity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger are 
of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence 
to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, 
property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly 
sacrificing the end to the means.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
According to John Locke, a leader’s first duty is to protect the 
country, not to follow the law.2 On September 12, 2001, a day after the 
events of September 11, during a National Security Council meeting, 
then-President George W. Bush told John Ashcroft, “Don’t ever let this 
happen again.”3 The message could not have been clearer: “The Presi-
dent had to do what he had to do to protect the country. And the lawyers 
had to find some way to make what he did legal.”4 
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 1. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 80 (2009) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 
1810) in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 418 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 2. Id. at 80–81. 
 3. Id. at 74–75 (quoting JOHN ASHCROFT, NEVER AGAIN: SECURING AMERICA AND 
RESTORING JUSTICE 130 (2006)). 
 4. Id. at 81. 
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Lawyers solve problems, however, by looking back rather than by 
looking forward.5 Typically, when presented with a legal problem, an 
attorney must apply the current law to the facts at hand. Indeed, even at 
the early stages of legal analysis, the lawyer may have a particular theory 
that he or she hopes to prove using the existing law. Yet, however 
thought-out and creative a particular theory is, the lawyer, especially a 
government attorney writing opinions that affect the constitutional rights 
of citizens, is not permitted to misconstrue the law to fit the theory. John 
Yoo, an attorney in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) who was largely 
responsible for authoring the infamous “torture memos,” misconstrued, 
twisted, and bent existing law to fit an illegitimate legal theory—that the 
use of harsh interrogation techniques would not constitute torture. 
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Executive 
Branch relied on the OLC for unprecedented legal advice on how to deal 
with issues of national security. Because the Executive Branch desired to 
operate within the confines of the law, it called upon government attor-
neys to find an optimal balance between protecting the country and pro-
tecting the country’s laws. According to Senator Bob Graham, “[W]e 
need excellent, aggressive lawyers who give sound, accurate legal advice 
. . . that [allows] the operators [to] do their jobs quickly and aggressively 
within the confines of law and regulation.”6 Because the President’s 
power to act must be authorized by an act of Congress or the Constitu-
tion itself,7 a team of lawyers, dubbed the “War Council,” drafted a series 
of memoranda with the goal of outlining the constitutional grounds for 
President Bush’s actions in the War on Terror.8 
The decision to intimately involve lawyers in national-security 
strategy, however, is not without consequences, resulting in concerns 
about the use of lawfare. Lawfare is defined as “the use of the law as a 
weapon of war.”9 Proponents of lawfare use it to obtain moral high 
ground over the enemy and to intimidate heads of state from acting out 
of fear of prosecution for war crimes.10 Al-Qaeda training manuals, for 
                                                 
 5. See id. at 133. 
 6. Id. at 92. 
 7. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (holding that the Presi-
dent’s power to issue an executive order must originate from an act of Congress or the Constitution). 
 8. See John Schwartz, Judge Allows Civil Lawsuit Over Claims of Torture, N.Y. TIMES, June 
13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/us/politics/14yoo.html (discussing how the War 
Council helped shape President Bush’s policy in the war on terrorism by authoring memoranda that 
authorized the harsh treatment of detainees). 
 9. Brooke Goldstein & Aaron Eitan Meyer, Legal Jihad: How Islamist Lawfare Tactics are 
Targeting Free Speech, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 395, 395 (2009) (citing David B. Rivkin & Lee 
A. Casey, Lawfare, WALL St. J. (Asia), Feb. 23, 2007, http://www.onlinewsj.com/article/ 
SB117220137149816987.html). 
 10. Id. 
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instance, instruct readers that, if captured, they should file claims of tor-
ture or other abuse regardless of whether such abuse actually occurred.11 
“Legal jihad” is another type of lawfare used to describe Islamist 
organizations that file lawsuits in American and foreign courts with the 
purpose of punishing those who engage in public discourse about radical 
Islam.12 The lawsuits are often baseless—filed merely to intimidate de-
fendants.13 For instance, the Council on American Islamic Relations sued 
Cass Ballenger, a former U.S. Congressman, for reporting the group to 
the CIA and FBI for allegedly raising funds for Hezbollah.14 Lawfare is 
not limited to American courts. For instance, because the United King-
dom’s libel laws are plaintiff-friendly, as opposed to America’s defen-
dant-friendly libel laws, the House of Lords established a government 
panel to look into the possibility of amending its laws to make it tougher 
for radical Islamic groups who bring defamation suits in Britain to inti-
midate writers.15 
With respect to the War on Terror, lawfare creates a fear that judi-
cially created remedies authorizing damages “would invite enemies to 
use our own federal courts to obstruct the Armed Forces’ ability to act 
decisively and without hesitation.”16 Because of the fear that our enemies 
would use our court system against our country’s government actors, 
Yoo defined torture so narrowly that the success of any prosecution or 
lawsuit alleging torture was unlikely. Authors of the OLC memoranda 
thus sought to find a way to circumnavigate the court system entirely. As 
Yoo wrote in his book, War by Other Means: An Insider’s Account of the 
War on Terror,17 he “developed an extra-judicial, ex parte assessment of 
enemy combatant status followed by indefinite military detention, with-
out notice of opportunity for a hearing of any sort. . . completely prec-
lud[ing] judicial review of the designation.”18 
The OLC memoranda and the use of lawfare formed the basis of 
Jose Padilla’s recent lawsuit. Padilla, an American citizen whom Presi-
                                                 
 11. Id. at 395–96. 
 12. Brooke Goldstein & Aaron Eitan Meyer, How Islamist Lawfare Tactics are Targeting Free 
Speech, THE COUNTER TERRORIST, Feb.–Mar. 2009, at 14, 16, available at http://www. 
thecounterterroristmag.com/pdf/Goldstein.Lawfare.lores.pdf. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Alan Dershowitz & Elizabeth Samson, The Chilling Effect of “Lawfare” Litigation, 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 9, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/ 
feb/09/libel-reform-radical-islamic-groups. 
 16. In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 105 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 17. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 
(2006). 
 18. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1014–15 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Plaintiff’s First 
Amended Complaint ¶ 36). 
1578 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1575 
dent Bush designated an enemy combatant19 in 2002, sued John Yoo20 
for the alleged abuse he suffered as a result of the memos Yoo au-
thored.21 Notably, Padilla’s capture was the impetus for two memoranda 
written by Yoo. The suit posed a question originally addressed by our 
Founding Fathers, which was how to balance fighting a war against ter-
ror—at home and abroad—with fighting a war using tactics of terror.22 
Determining the proper role of the Judiciary in such an inquiry presents 
another complicated legal question—is it proper to exclude the Judiciary 
from national-security issues due to the fear that enemy combatants will 
use the courts against the Executive Branch? While courts should defer 
to the coordinate branches of government with respect to the “core stra-
tegic matters of war making,”23 the Supreme Court has clearly held that a 
“state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the 
rights of the Nation’s citizens.”24 
This Note argues that, despite the concern that the use of lawfare 
threatens American national-security interests, Padilla v. Yoo was de-
cided correctly, both in its legal reasoning and in the appropriateness of 
the Judiciary’s intervention in a domestic question of constitutional 
rights. Part II examines Padilla’s capture and detention, as well as the 
development of the torture memos. Part III discusses the constitutional 
violations alleged in Padilla. Part IV suggests that, despite the use of 
lawfare, the Judiciary properly adjudicated a domestic-affairs issue and 
acted within its authority in not deferring to the coordinate branches of 
government. Part V analyzes the trial court’s reasoning in denying Yoo’s 
qualified-immunity defense. Finally, Part VI summarizes the balance 
government lawyers seek to achieve and the integral role of the Judiciary 
in that process. 
                                                 
 19. An enemy combatant is “[a] combatant captured and detained while serving in a hostile 
force during open warfare.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 20. Elaine Cassel, Jose Padilla’s Suit Against John Yoo: An Interesting Idea, But Will It Get 
Far?, FINDLAW, Jan. 14, 2008, http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/cassel/20080114.html. Attorneys 
working with the Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School filed the civil 
action on behalf of Padilla against John Yoo. Id. Ironically, Yoo is a Yale Law School graduate. Id. 
 21. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004) (“While we accord the greatest respect and 
consideration to the judgments of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of 
war, and recognize that the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide, it does not infringe on the 
core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally man-
dated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those presented here.”). 
 24. Id. at 536. 
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II. THE CONFLUENCE OF THE TORTURE MEMOS AND THE CAPTURE 
AND DETENTION OF JOSE PADILLA 
After Padilla was imprisoned as an enemy combatant, government 
officials attempted to find constitutional validity for harsh interrogation 
methods. Padilla remained in solitary confinement for three years with 
no charges filed against him; however, in 2005, criminal charges were 
suddenly filed.25 On August 16, 2007, a jury convicted Padilla and two 
codefendants of conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim people in a for-
eign country,26 conspiracy to provide material support for terrorists, and 
providing material support for terrorists.27 On January 22, 2008, Padilla 
was sentenced to seventeen years and four months28 in the Federal Max-
imum Security Prison in Florence, Colorado.29 This Part discusses the 
circumstances of Padilla’s capture, the conditions of his confinement 
prior to his civil suit against Yoo, and the development of the torture 
memos, which as noted above were drafted in part based on Padilla. 
A. “This guy Padilla’s a bad guy.”30 
Jose Padilla, later known as Abdullah al-Muhajr, was born in 
Brooklyn and raised with his four siblings in Chicago, where he began 
drinking and flashing gang symbols in his early teens.31 When he was 
                                                 
 25. Times Topics: Jose Padilla, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/ 
timestopics/people/p/jose_padilla/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=jose%20padilla&st=cse (last modified 
Mar. 6, 2009). 
 26. See Jeff St. Onge, Appeals Court Renews Charge Against Padilla, N.Y. SUN, Jan. 31, 2007, 
http://www.nysun.com/national/appeals-court-renews-charge-against-padilla/47699/. District Court 
Judge Marcia Cooke in Miami dismissed the charge of conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim 
because it charged Padilla twice for the same conduct. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit, however, reinstated the charge. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Associated Press, Jose Padilla Sentenced on Terrorism Charges, MSNBC, Jan. 22, 2008, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22784470/. 
 29. Kiely Lewandowski, Padilla Sent to Colorado “Supermax” Prison to Serve Out Terrorism 
Conspiracy Sentence, JURIST, Apr. 19, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/04/padilla-
sent-to-colorado-supermax.php. See also Peter A. Talevich, Note, During and in Relation to: How 
the Ninth Circuit Rewrote a Statute in the Case of the Millennium Bomber, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
477, 481 n.29 (2009) (citing Marianne Vollers, Inside Bomber Row, TIME, Nov. 5, 2006, at 36–40, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1555145,00.html) (“The inmate list 
of ADX Florence, as it is known, is a veritable ‘who’s who’ of terrorists involved in attacks against 
American interests.”). In addition to Padilla, the prison also holds Unabomber Ted Kaczynski; Okla-
homa City Federal Building accomplice Terry Nichols; the mastermind of the first attack on the 
World Trade Center, Ramzi Yousef; al-Qaeda shoe bomber Richard Reid; and September 11 conspi-
rator Zacharias Moussaui. Id. 
 30. Deborah Sontag, Terror Suspect’s Path From Streets to Brig, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/us/terror-suspect-s-path-from-streets-tobrig.html?pagewanted= 
all (quoting President Bush as saying “‘this guy Padilla’s a bad guy’”). This Part draws extensively 
from Sontag’s article. 
 31. Id. 
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fourteen, Padilla and a friend were drinking on a street corner and de-
cided to rob a couple of Mexican immigrants.32 Padilla’s friend stabbed 
one of the immigrants to death, and Padilla kicked him in the head “be-
cause he felt like it.”33 Padilla spent five years in a juvenile detention 
center.34 
In 1991, when he was twenty, Padilla got into a traffic dispute when 
he cut off and flashed a revolver at another driver.35 The other driver at-
tempted to follow Padilla, and Padilla fired a single shot into the air.36 
Padilla was charged with three felony counts and sent to jail.37 A few 
months into his sentence, Padilla was charged with battery on a law en-
forcement officer after he struck a prison guard.38 
At some point during this incarceration, Padilla decided to change 
his life. He began fasting and working out, and he read the Bible cover to 
cover.39 
Once released, Padilla worked at a Taco Bell and befriended the 
restaurant manager, Muhammed Javed, who was a cofounder of the 
Broward School of Islamic Studies.40 After visiting a mosque with Javed, 
Padilla began studying Arabic and scripture.41 Padilla decided that he 
wanted to immerse himself in the Arabic language and in Islam, so he 
moved to Egypt.42 He worked days teaching English at a private school 
and nights as a gym trainer and martial arts instructor.43 After returning 
from the Hajj,44 Padilla took a job teaching English in Yemen.45 
B. “[T]he hunt was on. . . .”46 
During the spring of 2002, Abu Zubaydah, a senior al-Qaeda offi-
cial under American custody at an undisclosed location overseas, told 
interrogators that al-Qaeda members had come to him with a proposal to 
                                                 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. The Hajj is the religious pilgrimage to Mecca. Times Topics: Hajj, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics 
.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/i/islam/hajj/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=hajj&st= 
cse (last visited April 6, 2011). 
 45. Sontag, supra note 30. 
 46. Id. 
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acquire and detonate a radiological device, a so-called dirty bomb.47 Zu-
baydah identified Padilla as part of the dirty bomb plot.48 On May 8, 
2002, Padilla checked in at the Zurich airport for a flight to Chicago.49 
Unbeknown to Padilla, Swiss and American intelligence agents also 
boarded the plane.50 Once Padilla landed at O’Hare, FBI agents arrested 
him based on a material witness warrant.51 American intelligence offi-
cials told reporters that the dirty bomb plot was in the early stages and a 
time for the detonation had not been set.52 Intelligence officials noted 
that, because of Padilla’s American citizenship, al-Qaeda leadership 
thought he would have an easier time accessing the United States to carry 
out the dirty bomb plot.53 
After his arrest, officials sent Padilla to the Metropolitan Correc-
tions Center in downtown Manhattan.54 On June 9, 2002, while a motion 
was pending to vacate the material witness warrant, then-President 
George W. Bush, consistent with the advice from Yoo in the “Determi-
nation of Enemy Belligerency and Military Detention” memo, issued an 
order that declared Padilla an enemy combatant and directed Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld to take Padilla into protective military custo-
dy.55 At the time, so long as Padilla was held under military authority, he 
could be detained indefinitely.56 According to the President, Padilla was 
associated with al-Qaeda, was engaged in conduct that constituted hostile 
and war-like acts, and represented a “continuing, present and grave dan-
ger to the national security of the United States”; thus, Padilla’s detention 
would “prevent him from aiding al-Qaeda in its efforts to attack the 
United States or its armed forces, other governmental personnel, or citi-
zens.”57 
Although Padilla’s arrest was viewed as an antiterrorism victory, 
skeptics questioned the lack of formal criminal charges brought against 
                                                 
 47. James Risen & Philip Shenon, Traces of Terror: The Investigation; U.S. Says It Halted 
Qaeda Plot to Use Radioactive Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2002/06/11/national/11ARRE.html. 
 48. See Sontag, supra note 30. Zubaydah did not refer to Padilla by name; instead, he described 
him physically and referred to him as a Latin-American. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Risen & Shenon, supra note 47. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Sontag, supra note 30. 
 55. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Sec’y of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
(June 9, 2002) [hereinafter Memorandum from President George W. Bush], reprinted in Padilla v. 
Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006). 
 56. See Sontag, supra note 30. 
 57. Memorandum from President George W. Bush, supra note 55. 
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him.58 Democrats and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) ques-
tioned whether Padilla’s arrest was part of a pattern in which the Bush 
Administration orchestrated its announcements to advance the adminis-
tration’s interests.59 According to an ACLU spokesperson, while the ad-
ministration’s position was that it would not disclose information about 
terrorist plots it disrupted, the administration did, in fact, emerge with a 
new announcement each time it faced criticism.60 
C. Legally Justifying Torture 
Meanwhile, a little-known department of the government, tasked 
with setting the outer limits of the President’s authority in a time of war, 
analyzed the legal strategies the Executive Branch could take with re-
spect to Padilla. Before the torture memos became public, neither the 
authority bestowed to the OLC nor the shield the OLC provided to those 
who relied on its opinions was widely known. The OLC’s power was so 
great that it was “practically impossible to prosecute someone who relied 
in good faith on an OLC opinion, even if the opinion turns out to be 
wrong.”61 Thus, one consequence of the OLC’s power to interpret the 
law was the power to give government officials a potential shield for ac-
tions taken at the edges of vague criminal laws.62 This section describes 
the structure of the OLC and details the three memos that pertained to 
Padilla. 
1. The Office of Legal Counsel 
The OLC is located within the Department of Justice and “functions 
as a kind of general counsel” to the Executive Branch.63 OLC opinions 
                                                 
 58. Adam Liptak, Traces of Terror: The Courts; Questions on U.S. Action in Bomb Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/11/us/traces-of-terror-the-courts-questions-
on-us-action-in-bomb-case.html. 
 59. Neil A. Lewis, Traces of Terror: The Disclosure; Questions of Timing Arise With New 
Information, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/12/us/traces-of-terror-
the-disclosures-questions-of-timing-arise-with-new-information.html. 
 60. Id. (quoting Laura W. Murphy, Director of the Washington office of the ACLU). 
 61. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 96. 
 62. Id. at 96–97. 
 63. Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive 
Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1577 (2007). Conversely, the Office of the White House Counsel is 
located within the White House and has a much smaller mandate. Tung Yin, Great Minds Think 
Alike: The “Torture Memo,” Office of Legal Counsel, And Sharing the Boss’s Mindset, 45 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 473, 477 (2009). Typically, instead of providing legal response to specific 
inquiries, the White House Counsel monitors potential conflicts of interest within the White House, 
helps to vet judicial and cabinet nominees, and advises on potential legislation. See Anthony Saul 
Alperin, The Attorney–Client Privilege and the White House Counsel, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 199, 
209–11 (2002). Lastly, the White House Counsel provides an informal channel between the Presi-
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are published as Opinions of the Attorney General.64 The OLC’s inter-
pretations of law are typically considered binding within the Executive 
Branch, unless overridden by the Attorney General or the President.65 
At the time of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Assistant 
Attorney General Jay S. Bybee headed the OLC.66 Yoo, a Deputy Attor-
ney General, was in charge of foreign affairs and national security for the 
OLC.67 Although Bybee led the OLC, Yoo authored the three memoran-
da that would form the subject matter of Padilla’s civil claim: two that 
specifically referenced Padilla, and a third, and most controversial, that 
narrowly interpreted a torture statute.68 
2. The Three Memos Pertaining to Padilla 
Yoo’s first memo, “Determination of Enemy Belligerency and 
Military Detention,”69 concluded that Padilla qualified as an enemy com-
batant under the laws of armed conflict. The memo relied heavily on Ex 
parte Quirin,70 a World War II-era case in which German saboteurs infil-
trated New York and Chicago. In Quirin, the Supreme Court reasoned, 
“[T]hose who during [a] time of war pass surreptitiously from enemy 
territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the 
commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have 
the status of unlawful combatants . . . .”71 Thus, the Court explained, 
“[L]awful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of 
war by opposing military forces,” and “[u]nlawful combatants are like-
wise subject to capture and detention.”72 
                                                                                                             
dent and the Attorney General. See Jeremy Rabkin, At the President’s Side: The Role of the White 
House Counsel in Constitutional Policy, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 80–81 (1993). 
 64. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2009). 
 65. Johnsen, supra note 63, at 1577. 
 66. Yin, supra note 63, at 477. During 2002, President Bush appointed Bybee for a judgeship 
on the Ninth Circuit. Harry Weinstein, Conservative Confirmed as 9th Circuit Judge, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 14, 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/14/local/me-bybee14. Former University of 
Chicago law professor Jack Goldsmith replaced Bybee atop the OLC. Yin, supra note 63, at 478. 
 67. Yin, supra note 63, at 477. 
 68. Yoo authored numerous memos while working for the OLC. For a thorough index of OLC 
memoranda during the war on terror, see Index of Bush-Era OLC Memoranda Relating to Interroga-
tion, Detention, Rendition and/or Surveillance, ACLU, Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.aclu.org/ 
pdfs/safefree/olcmemos_2009_0305.pdf. 
 69. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL: DETERMINATION OF ENEMY BELLIGERENCY AND MILITARY DETENTION (2002), availa-
ble at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memomilitarydetention06082002.pdf [hereinafter 
ENEMY BELLIGERENCY MEMO]. 
 70. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 71. ENEMY BELLIGERENCY MEMO, supra note 69, at 3 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 
35). 
 72. Id. at 2 (quoting Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31). 
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Yoo compared Padilla’s capture to the situation in Quirin, arguing 
that Quirin allows the President, under the Commander-in-Chief power 
in Article II of the U.S. Constitution, to direct the armed forces to seize 
enemy combatants in an armed conflict and detain them until the end of 
any armed conflict.73 Here, Padilla met with a senior al-Qaeda operative 
while living abroad and discussed a plan to detonate a radiological ex-
plosive device within the United States.74 Further, like in Quirin, Padilla 
entered the United States as part of a plan to conduct acts of sabotage 
that could have resulted in a massive loss of life.75 
The second memo naming Padilla, “Re: Applicability of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4001(a) to Military Detention of United States Citizens,”76 argued that 
the transfer of Padilla from the custody of the Department of Justice to 
the control of the Department of Defense violated the federal Non-
Detention Act.77 This statute states that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned 
or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an act of 
Congress.”78 According to Yoo, this law did not apply to Padilla because 
military detention of enemy combatants serves a different goal than de-
tention of civilians.79 While the purpose of law-enforcement detention is 
punitive, the exclusive purpose of military detention is to prevent the 
captured individual from serving the enemy.80 Thus, the Non-Detention 
Act did not, and could not, intrude upon the core presidential function of 
capturing and detaining members of the enemy.81 
Yoo additionally stated that the President’s authority to detain an 
enemy combatant is not limited by a showing of American citizenship.82 
For instance, in In re Territo, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that “it is immaterial to the legality of petitioner’s detention as a prisoner 
of war by American military authorities whether petitioner is or is not a 
citizen of the United States of America.”83 
Finally, Yoo’s most controversial memo, “Standards of Conduct for 
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A” (Torture Statute 
                                                 
 73. Id. at 1–2. 
 74. Id. at 3. 
 75. Id. 
 76. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR DANIEL J. 
BRYANT, RE: APPLICABILITY OF 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) TO MILITARY DETENTION OF UNITED STATES 
CITIZENS (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memodetentionuscitizens 
06272002.pdf [hereinafter MILITARY DETENTION MEMO]. 
 77. Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1971). 
 78. Id. at § 4001(a) (emphasis added). 
 79. MILITARY DETENTION MEMO, supra note 76, at 2–3. 
 80. Id. at 3. 
 81. Id. at 2. 
 82. Id. at 4. 
 83. In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 144 (9th Cir. 1946). 
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Memo),84 provided additional support for Padilla’s civil suit. According 
to 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, it is a crime for any U.S. national to commit or 
attempt to commit torture.85 Torture is defined as “an act committed by a 
person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict se-
vere physical or mental suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental 
to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical 
control.”86 Ultimately, Yoo concluded while “certain acts may be cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading,” the acts may fall outside § 2340A.87 
Yoo began the Torture Statute Memo by analyzing the plain lan-
guage of each element of § 2340. First, Yoo concluded that “specifically 
intended” constituted a subjective element—the prosecution must prove 
that the defendant acted with “specific intent” to torture.88 Thus, to act 
with specific intent, “the infliction of such pain must be the defendant’s 
precise objective.”89 Conversely, if the defendant possessed knowledge 
that severe pain would result from his actions, but causing such harm 
was not his objective, then the defendant merely possessed general intent 
and did not possess the requisite mental state to violate the statute.90 Ad-
ditionally, if the defendant acted “with a good faith belief that his con-
duct would not produce the result that the law prohibits,” the specific 
intent element would be negated.91 Yoo did not define good faith; how-
ever, relying on Cheek v. United States,92 he stated that “[a] good faith 
belief need not be a reasonable one.”93 While the Supreme Court did, 
indeed, hold that an unreasonable good faith belief negated specific in-
tent, Cheek involved the complex tax code and the Court’s belief that a 
taxpayer should be given the benefit of the doubt.94 Arguably, because 
the torture statute is not nearly as complex as the tax code, the threshold 
for good faith should be different.95 
Second, Yoo defined “severe pain or suffering” by considering ba-
sic rules of grammar and statutory construction. Yoo opined that “inflic-
                                                 
 84. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR ALBERTO R. 
GONZALES, RE: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR INTERROGATION UNDER 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 
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 88. Id. at 3. 
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 90. Id. at 3–4. 
 91. Id. at 4. 
 92. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991). 
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 94. Yin, supra note 63, at 480. 
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tion of pain or suffering per se, whether it is physical or mental, is insuf-
ficient to amount to torture.”96 Rather, to amount to torture, the pain or 
suffering “must be severe.”97 Grammatically, Yoo was correct—“severe” 
modifies “pain and suffering.” But Yoo interpreted this grammatical 
shortcoming to set forth a standard of conduct that would allow all but 
the most egregious forms of torture. Because § 2340 did not define the 
term “severe pain,” Yoo relied on the common rule of statutory construc-
tion, which gives ambiguous terms the same definition found in other 
statutes.98 The phrase “severe pain” appears in a statute defining an 
emergency medical condition for the purpose of providing health bene-
fits.99 This statute defines an emergency condition as one that placed the 
health of the individual “(i) in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment 
to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or 
part.”100 
Although the medical statute addressed a substantially different 
subject than the substance of § 2340, Yoo argued that it was “nonetheless 
helpful for understanding what constitutes severe physical pain.”101 De-
spite the tenuous connection between the medical statute and the torture 
statute, Yoo used the medical statute to define the outer limits of torture 
tactics that American military and intelligence officials could use during 
interrogations of detainees. He concluded that the damage to the detainee 
“must rise to the level of death, organ failure, or the permanent impair-
ment of a significant body function.”102 
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pushing someone to the “brink of suicide” would be a sufficient disruption of the personality to 
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Finally, Yoo considered the applicability of § 2340A in relation to 
the President’s constitutional powers. According to Yoo, § 2340A does 
not apply to the President’s detention and interrogation of enemy comba-
tants.103 Yoo’s reasoning was synonymous with the fear of lawfare: if 
executive officials were subject to prosecution for conducting interroga-
tions while carrying out the President’s Commander-in-Chief power, “it 
would significantly burden and immeasurably impair the President’s 
ability to fulfill his constitutional duties.”104 Thus, in order to respect the 
President’s inherent constitutional authority to manage a military cam-
paign against al-Qaeda and its allies, § 2340A must be construed as in-
applicable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to the Commander-in-
Chief authority.105 
III. LAWFARE AND LAWSUITS: PADILLA V. YOO 
On June 9, 2002, Department of Defense officials took Padilla into 
custody without charging him and transported him to the Consolidated 
Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina.106 In an empty wing of the 
military brig, the officials placed Padilla in a tiny cell where 
Padilla alleges that he was “subjected to a systematic program of 
unlawful interrogation methods and conditions of confinement, 
which proximately and foreseeably caused [him] to suffer extreme 
isolation, sensory deprivation, severe physical pain, sleep depriva-
tion, and profound disruption of his senses, all well beyond the 
physical and mental discomfort that normally accompanies incarce-
ration.”107 
According to Padilla, Yoo personally provided numerous legal 
memoranda that purported to provide government agents a legal basis to 
implement an extreme and unprecedented interrogation and detention 
program—even though such tactics were unprecedented in U.S. history 
and clearly contrary to the U.S. Constitution and the law of war. Based 
on the series of memoranda authored by Yoo, Padilla alleged that Yoo 
proximately and foreseeably injured him by violating numerous clearly 
established constitutional and statutory rights: (1) denial of access to 
                                                                                                             
constitute a “profound disruption.” Id. Although Yoo listed four examples of what would likely be 
considered a “profound disruption,” he did not give examples of what would not reach that standard 
of treatment thus signaling that actions falling outside his enumerated examples would fall beyond 
the statute. See id. 
 103. TORTURE STATUTE MEMO, supra note 84, at 35. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 34. 
 106. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 107. Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint ¶ 45). 
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counsel, (2) denial of access to court, (3) unconstitutional conditions of 
confinement, (4) unconstitutional interrogations, (5) denial of freedom of 
religion, (6) denial of the right of information, (7) denial of the right to 
association, (8) unconstitutional military detention, (9) denial of the right 
to be free from unreasonable seizures, and (10) denial of due process.108 
Padilla’s complaint also contained an exhaustive list of twenty-five 
specific types of interrogation tactics and policies, including the follow-
ing: (1) extreme and prolonged isolation; (2) deprivation of light and ex-
posure to prolonged periods of artificial light, sometimes in excess of 
twenty-four hours; (3) extreme and deliberate variations in the tempera-
ture of his cell; (4) sleep adjustment; (5) threats to subject him to physi-
cal abuse that would result in severe physical pain and suffering, or 
death, including threats to cut him with a knife and pour alcohol into the 
wounds; (6) threats to kill him immediately; (7) threats to transfer him to 
a location outside of the United States, to a foreign country or Guanta-
namo, where he was told he would be subjected to far-worse treatment; 
(8) administering to him or making believe that he was being adminis-
tered psychotropic drugs against his will; (9) shackling and manacling 
for hours at a time; (10) forcing him into markedly uncomfortable and 
painful (or “stress”) positions; (11) requiring him to wear earphones and 
black-out goggles during movement to, from, and within the brig; (12) 
introducing into his cell noxious fumes that caused pain to the eyes and 
nose; (13) lying to him about his location and the identity of his interro-
gators; (14) loud noises at all hours of the night, caused by government 
agents banging on the walls and bars of his cell or opening and shutting 
the doors to nearby empty cells; (15) withholding a mattress, pillow, 
sheet or blanket, leaving him with nothing to sleep or rest on except a 
cold steel slab; (16) forced grooming; (17) sudden and unexplained sus-
pension of showers; (18) sudden and unexplained removal of religious 
items; (19) constant surveillance, including during the use of toilet facili-
ties and showers; (20) blackening out of the interior and exterior win-
dows of his cell; (21) deprivation of access to any form of information 
about the outside world, including radio, television, and newspapers from 
the time of his imprisonment in the military brig until summer 2004, at 
which time he was allowed very limited access to such materials; (22) 
denial of sufficient exercise and recreation and, when permitted intermit-
tently, only in a concrete cage and often at night; (23) denial of any me-
chanism to tell time in order to ascertain the time for prayer in keeping 
with the Muslim practice; (24) denial of access to the Koran for most of 
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his detention; and (25) complete deprivation or inadequate medical care 
for serious and potentially life-threatening ailments.109 
Yoo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying heavily on the 
qualified-immunity defense; however, the court denied his motion in re-
gard to all of Padilla’s claims.110 
IV. DESPITE THE USE OF LAWFARE, THE JUDICIARY PROPERLY 
INTERVENED TO RESOLVE PADILLA’S CLAIMS 
When drafting his memoranda on the treatment of Padilla, Yoo ar-
ticulated a strong vision of executive power. The vision was designed, in 
part, to navigate around the Judiciary, which would be susceptible to 
lawfare tactics. Thus, it came as no surprise that Yoo’s defense to Padil-
la’s claims relied on a similar philosophy: the Judiciary should not be 
involved in a dispute over the President’s constitutional authority during 
an armed conflict. 
A United States District Court in California, however, thought oth-
erwise and properly rejected Yoo’s attempt to circumnavigate the Judi-
ciary. In order to support “a government of laws, and not of men,”111 the 
Judiciary cannot be sidelined when it comes to matters of national securi-
ty. Thus, despite Padilla’s use of lawfare, the Judiciary was the proper 
forum to adjudicate Padilla for three reasons. First, our nation is founded 
upon a principle of three independent branches of government, where 
each branch checks the actions of the other two. Second, although the 
threat of lawfare comes primarily from foreign sources, Padilla is an 
American citizen, detained on American soil, whose fate was determined 
by American lawyers. Finally, the Judiciary has the power to recognize 
causes of action for constitutional violations despite the absence of a sta-
tute that authorizes such a cause of action. 
A. Separation of Powers and the Proper Role of the Judiciary 
“The separation of governmental powers into the Legislature, Ex-
ecutive, and Judiciary is fundamental to our democratic government, and 
under the Constitution, no one department may interfere with or en-
croach upon either of the other branches.”112 Lawfare tactics turn the Ju-
diciary into a potential weapon against the other branches of government 
and government employees. For instance, the threat of criminal prosecu-
tion or tort liability has the potential to chill the efforts of individual gov-
                                                 
 109. Id. at 1013–14. 
 110. Id. at 1039–40 (granting Padilla leave to amend his claim for a violation of his Fifth 
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination). 
 111. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
 112. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 215 (2009). 
1590 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1575 
ernment actors. In the case of Padilla, by defining torture so narrowly, 
Yoo sought to remove the Judiciary from the separation-of-powers equa-
tion. Government agents were free to operate under the golden shield 
created by Yoo’s memos, which minimized the chance that the Judiciary 
would hear a claim involving torture. The structural provisions of the 
Constitution, however, prevent the accumulation of power in the hands 
of a single person or group regardless of the motivation to consolidate 
power.113 Thus, if any branch of government acts beyond the bounds of 
the authority granted to it from the Constitution, the Judiciary, and the 
Judiciary alone, may consider such action unconstitutional and void.114  
Despite potential misuse of the court system through lawfare tac-
tics, the Judiciary is the proper branch to hear torture claims because of 
its unique functional position. While theoretically each branch is inde-
pendent, in practice, the directive of each branch inherently changes the 
power balance between the other branches. For instance, the Judiciary’s 
breadth of power is limited by the jurisdiction granted to it by Article III 
of the Constitution; therefore, it is the most reactive of the three 
branches.115 The Executive and Legislative Branches, on the other hand, 
are proactive branches of government.116 Because the Judiciary must wait 
for an issue to be presented in court, it functions as both a stopgap and a 
neutral arbiter that must deal with the issue before it. Without judicial 
involvement, the power to make and interpret law would be left to the 
Legislative and the Executive Branches—and the motive to avoid law-
fare would be too tempting. Removing the Judiciary mirrors Yoo’s strat-
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egy—interpret torture in a way that makes it unlikely that a civil suit or 
prosecution would arise. Yoo’s strategy, however, was not grounded in 
precedent. 
The Judiciary’s traditional role in deciding the law117 was evident, 
for example, when it ruled that the President acted outside the scope of 
his constitutional authority118 and when it held that the Legislative and 
Executive Branches, despite being in agreement, could not reallocate 
their respective authorities.119 In the first example, the President of the 
United States directed the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of 
and operate most of the nation’s steel mills.120 The Court held that the 
President’s order amounted to lawmaking, a legislative function, which 
the Constitution had expressly confided to Congress and not the Presi-
dent.121 The President’s power to act must stem either from an act of 
Congress or from the Constitution itself.122 In the second example, Con-
gress enacted the Line Item Veto Act, which gave the President the pow-
er to “cancel in whole” three types of provisions that had been signed 
into law.123 Although the Legislative and Executive Branches approved 
this reallocation of power, the Court held that the Line Item Veto Act 
was unconstitutional because it ignored the Presentment Clause124 of the 
Constitution.125 The Court reasoned that, despite the agreement of the 
branches, a textual provision of the Constitution could not be ignored.126 
Thus, action outside the constitutional structure is unconstitutional. 
By narrowly defining the law of torture so that any lawsuit would 
become exceedingly unlikely to succeed in the courts, in effect, Yoo at-
tempted to circumvent the Judiciary. The Judiciary, however, cannot be 
considered removable merely because lawfare threatens its misuse. After 
all, the Judiciary vindicates the injured and the accused. Moreover, the 
Founding Fathers modeled our government so that one or two branches 
could not control the government. Collusion between independent 
branches of government “may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
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tyranny.”127 Thus, regardless of whether the branches are in agreement or 
in conflict, the principle is that all three branches must be involved in 
questions of national security, specifically when it comes to torture. 
B. Padilla Presented Purely Domestic Questions of Law 
Padilla presented a question of domestic concern—whether, and to 
what extent, a government lawyer should be held liable for his interpreta-
tion of law that he knows will be relied and acted upon by others. Unlike 
a lawsuit filed by an alien, Padilla’s suit is one filed by an American citi-
zen against an American lawyer who operated in a role to direct the 
treatment of an American citizen on American soil. Concern that the Ju-
diciary will become susceptible to lawfare tactics does not erase Padilla’s 
potentially valid allegations and the potential constitutional protections to 
which he is entitled as an American citizen. 
Padilla is dissimilar to Arar v. Ashcroft, in which the court refused 
to provide a civil remedy in the foreign policy context.128 In Arar, Maher 
Arar filed an action against senior officials in the American government 
and alleged abuse through harsh interrogation techniques.129 Unlike Pa-
dilla, Arar was not a citizen of the United States and was only temporari-
ly on American soil. In 2002, Arar, a dual citizen of Canada and Syria, 
was seized after he landed at Kennedy Airport in New York and, two 
weeks later, through the practice of extraordinary rendition, was flown to 
Syria, where he claimed he was held for ten months in a tiny cell and 
beaten repeatedly with a metal cable.130 
In 2006, Arar filed a civil suit against Ashcroft, Director of the FBI 
Robert Mueller, senior immigration officials, and others in the Eastern 
District of New York.131 Arar sought a Bivens132 remedy for the alleged 
violation of his right to substantive due process. The Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit noted that this lawsuit presented questions touch-
ing on the role of the Executive Branch in combating terrorist forces with 
international allies.133 The court then distinguished matters that go 
beyond the borders of the United States—which necessarily affect the 
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country’s relationship with foreign countries—from matters that exist 
solely within the boundaries of the Unites States.134 Because the success 
in combating international terrorism requires coordination between the 
law-enforcement and foreign-policy officials of foreign governments,135 
the court held that three special factors counseled hesitation in awarding 
civil damages under Arar’s Bivens claim.136 None of these factors is 
present in Padilla. 
First, unlike Arar, an alien, Padilla is an American citizen and 
American citizens retain the right to challenge their detainment under the 
writ of habeas corpus.137 In Arar, the court reasoned that Article I, Sec-
tion 8 of the Constitution placed the regulation of aliens squarely within 
the authority of the Legislative Branch.138 Because Congress had yet to 
take any affirmative position on federal court review of extraordinary 
renditions, Congress had not explicitly created a private cause of action 
to plaintiffs in Arar’s position.139 Padilla, on the other hand, is an Ameri-
can citizen, and so the regulation of aliens is not applicable to his law-
suit. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that absent suspen-
sion of the writ, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every in-
dividual detained within the United States.140 Therefore, a United States 
citizen who is classified as an enemy combatant has due process rights to 
receive notice of the factual basis of his classification and a fair opportu-
nity to rebut the government’s factual assertions before a neutral deci-
sion-maker.141 Thus, because Padilla is an American citizen, he retains 
the right to challenge his detainment and the right to bring a civil claim 
for injuries that arise as a result of the detainment. 
Second, unlike in Arar, where Arar was captured in the United 
States and sent to Syria through extraordinary rendition, Padilla remained 
on American soil under the control of American personnel during his 
entire detention. Extraordinary rendition involves the exchange of dip-
lomatic, security, and intelligence information between the intelligence 
agencies of foreign countries.142 The potential for public exposure of 
such classified information through lawfare tactics entails the risk that 
other countries would become less willing to cooperate with the U.S. in 
sharing intelligence resources to counter terrorism. But in Padilla, the 
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exchange of information between the United States and foreign countries 
was limited to the investigation and surveillance of Padilla. Once Padilla 
was apprehended, the United States’ need to exchange information with 
foreign countries ceased. Additionally, Padilla did not allege that for-
eign-intelligence agents took part in any phase of his detention, further 
diminishing potential foreign-policy tension between the United States 
and foreign countries. In sum, the potential risk of exposing the involve-
ment of foreign countries in a case of domestic lawfare was low, so the 
likelihood that foreign countries would cease cooperating with the Unit-
ed States was also low. 
The final and most important distinction between Arar and Padilla 
is “the fundamental difference between courts evaluating the legitimacy 
of actions taken by federal officials in the domestic arena and evaluating 
the same conduct when taken in the international realm.”143 For instance, 
a qualified-immunity claim in international terrorism cases, like Arar, 
would offer inadequate protection because jurisprudence in the interna-
tional realm is one where most domestic judges lack any special compe-
tence.144 On the other hand, in domestic terrorism cases like Padilla, 
judges have constitutional authority to evaluate government officials’ 
decision-making in the domestic context.145 Additionally, judges also 
have experience derived from living in the same environment as domes-
tic officials.146 Courts, therefore, are properly set up to successfully adju-
dicate a terrorism lawsuit when the facts of the case involve substantially 
domestic concerns, such as those presented in Padilla. 
In sum, the issue presented in Padilla poses significant implications 
pertaining to both the rights of American citizens and the actions of gov-
ernment lawyers who write legal memoranda. The issue presented in Pa-
dilla, furthermore, has a low probability of affecting the nation’s rela-
tionship with foreign allies. Finally, unlike international terrorism cases, 
American judges in American courts are uniquely situated to successful-
ly adjudicate criminal and civil claims that arise out of domestic terror-
ism. Thus, despite the potential misuse of the court system through law-
fare tactics, the Judiciary properly accepted review of Padilla’s lawsuit. 
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C. Pursuant to Bivens, a Court May Have Reason to Extend 
a Remedy Despite the Absence of a Statute 
Had the Judiciary succumbed to the fear of lawfare, it would have 
denied Padilla access to the courts and any potential remedy for valid 
claims. A Bivens remedy, however, enables a court to cure a constitu-
tional violation despite the absence of a statute conferring such a right.147 
In determining whether a Bivens remedy exists, a court applies a two-
pronged test. First, the court determines whether an existing process 
would adequately protect the plaintiff’s interest.148 Second, the court de-
termines whether “any special factors counseling hesitation [exist] before 
authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.”149 
In Padilla, the court’s Bivens analysis underscores two conclusions. 
First, without the Judiciary, it would be impossible for Padilla to seek a 
remedy for his alleged injuries. Second, despite the importance of thwart-
ing terrorism, nothing in Padilla supports the conclusion that courts 
should defer adjudication of Padilla’s claim. 
With regard to the first prong of the Bivens analysis, Padilla had no 
other means of redress for the alleged injuries that he sustained during 
his detention.150 Three reasons support this conclusion. First, the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, which authorizes trial by military commis-
sions for violations of laws of war, only applies to alien, or noncitizen, 
unlawful enemy combatants.151 Because Padilla is an American citizen, 
the Military Commissions Act of 2006 could not apply to him. Second, 
the other branches of government had not acted to provide an alternative 
remedy for the type of constitutional violations alleged in this case.152 
Thus, Padilla had no other judicial remedies to allege. And third, a ha-
beas petition would not have provided an adequate, alternative remedy 
because the habeas petition would have had to be filed against the mili-
tary commander in charge of the brig where Padilla was confined, not 
against Yoo.153 
                                                 
 147. Id. at 267. 
 148. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 
551 U.S. 537, 537–38 (2007)). 
 149. Id. (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 948r(c) (2006)). 
 152. Id. at 1020–21. In deciding that there were no other alternatives for Padilla to pursue, the 
court relied on various newspaper articles criticizing the Obama Administration for not investigating 
cases of alleged torture. Id. For example, “President Obama has shown little interest in prosecuting 
officials of the previous administration, and it is not clear whether there will be a government-
sponsored investigation of Bush administration policies.” John Schwartz, Judge Weighs Dismissing 
Case Involving Torture Memorandums, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 
03/07/us/07yoo.html. 
 153. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1021.  
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Under the second prong of the Bivens analysis, “special factors 
counseling hesitation ‘relate not to the merits of the particular remedy, 
but to the question of who should decide whether such a remedy should 
be provided.’”154 “[C]ourts should avoid creating a new, nonstatutory 
remedy when doing so would be ‘plainly inconsistent’ with authority 
constitutionally reserved for the political branches.”155 No special factors 
counseled hesitation in Padilla for four reasons. 
First, although Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Mili-
tary Force (AUMF), which authorized the President to make enemy 
combatant designations, Congress had not spoken, specifically or defini-
tively, regarding the constitutional standard for the treatment of enemy 
combatants.156 Relying on Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,157 the court in Padilla 
noted that all three branches of the government have a role to play when 
individual liberties are at stake and, further, there was no indication that 
the Judiciary was precluded from review of Executive decisions made 
pursuant to the AUMF.158 Because Congress did not explicitly exclude 
the Judiciary, courts are not precluded from reviewing the treatment of 
plaintiffs like Padilla. 
Second, “a state of war is not a blank check for the President when 
it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”159 Furthermore, “it does 
not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their 
own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of review and 
resolving claims like those presented” in Padilla.160 Granted, courts 
should be cautious when intruding upon the judgment and discretion of 
military authorities by targeting the government attorneys who advise 
military leaders.161 And the Judiciary should defer to the Legislative and 
Executive Branches of government with respect to the core strategic mat-
ters of war-making.162 Padilla’s allegations, however, “concern the poss-
ible constitutional trespass on a detained individual citizen’s liber-
ties. . . .”163 The war power, therefore, “is a power to wage war success-
fully . . . [b]ut even the war power does not remove constitutional limita-
                                                 
 154. Id. at 1022 (quoting Sanches-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). 
 155. Id. (quoting In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 103 (D.D.C. 2007)). 
 156. Id. at 1026. 
 157. 542 U.S. 531 (2004). 
 158. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1026 (“The joint resolution does not create a remedial scheme, 
similar to the separate regime of military justice, or the elaborate remedial schemes set out, for in-
stance, by the Social Security Act or the Civil Service Reform Act.”). 
 159. Id. at 1027–28 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)). 
 160. Id. (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536). 
 161. Id. at 1027. 
 162. Id. at 1028. 
 163. Id. 
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tions safeguarding essential liberties.”164 Thus, the Commander in 
Chief’s power is limited to creating war strategy, whereas it is within the 
Judiciary’s power to safeguard constitutional liberties. 
Third, Padilla does not threaten the revelation of government se-
crets. During the course of the Padilla case, all of the documents drafted 
by Yoo, which were mentioned in the complaint, eventually became pub-
lic record through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests; thus, 
there was little chance of revealing government secrets.165 In addition, 
Yoo’s argument amounted to an assertion of the state-secrets privilege. 
Should a privilege surface on behalf of the government, the Judiciary 
could and would address those concerns in due time in order to manage 
the case.166 And finally, while litigation may cause expenditure of valua-
ble time and resources, litigation may be necessary to ensure that offi-
cials comply with the law.167 
Lastly, as discussed in section B, Padilla’s claim involved Ameri-
can officials’ treatment of an American citizen within the country’s 
boundaries. The treatment of an American citizen on American soil does 
not raise the same specter of policy issues as does a case involving for-
eign relations.168 
In sum, Padilla’s claims were rightly adjudicated by the Judiciary. 
“[A] government of laws, and not of men”169 demands that the Judiciary 
play a role in interpreting policy decisions that affect citizens of this 
country. Additionally, the nation’s relationship with foreign governments 
is not likely to be negatively affected in matters involving an American 
government attorney and American citizens who are detained on Ameri-
can soil. Moreover, without the involvement of the Judiciary, plaintiffs 
with potentially valid claims would be left without any remedy. 
V. IN CASES LIKE PADILLA, IT IS APPROPRIATE TO DENY QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY FOR HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
With the role of the Judiciary properly established, the threat of 
lawfare dissipates in light of the Judiciary’s adjudication of similar 
claims against government attorneys. For instance, Padilla is not the only 
case dealing with liability for high-ranking lawyers within the Bush Ad-
ministration to come out of the Ninth Circuit in recent years. In Septem-
ber 2009, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
                                                 
 164. Id. (quoting Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934)). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 1030. 
 169. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
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cuit affirmed a district court ruling that denied former Attorney General 
John Ashcroft’s motion to dismiss allegations that he misused the federal 
material witness statute170 to unlawfully investigate and preemptively 
detain Abdullah al-Kidd for suspected terrorist activities. While the court 
in Padilla did not rely on al-Kidd,171 both cases evidence the Judiciary’s 
role in balancing constitutional rights against the ability to effectively 
advise the President and implement polices during the War on Terror. 
Additionally, there is established precedent in denying qualified immuni-
ty to government attorneys who author unsound legal opinions. 
A. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft 
On March 14, 2003, the Idaho U.S. Attorney’s Office submitted an 
application to a magistrate judge seeking al-Kidd’s arrest as a material 
witness in the trial of Sami Omar Al-Hussayen.172 Two days later, pur-
suant to the material witness warrant, United States agents arrested al-
Kidd, a United States citizen, at Dulles International Airport.173 Over the 
next sixteen days, he was confined in high-security cells—lit twenty-four 
hours a day—in Virginia, Oklahoma, and Idaho.174 Because he was never 
called as a witness in the Al-Hussayan trial or in any other criminal pro-
ceeding,175 al-Kidd alleged that he was arrested and confined because 
Ashcroft promulgated policies to unlawfully use the federal material wit-
ness statute to investigate or preemptively detain terrorist suspects.176 In 
response, Ashcroft claimed absolute immunity and, in the alternative, 
qualified immunity.177 
                                                 
 170. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (2006) (“If, after a hearing . . . the judicial officers finds that no 
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as re-
quired . . . such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial.”). 
 171. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 172. Id. at 952. On February 13, 2003, a federal grand jury in Idaho indicted Al-Hussayan for 
visa fraud and making false statements to U.S. officials. Id. 
 173. See id. at 951. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 954. 
 176. Id. at 952. Al-Kidd made three claims against Ashcroft. First, he alleged that Ashcroft was 
responsible for a policy or practice under which the FBI sought material witness orders without 
sufficient evidence that the witness’s testimony was material to another proceeding, or that it was 
impracticable to secure the witness’s testimony. Id. at 957. Second, al-Kidd alleged that Ashcroft 
designed and implemented a policy under which the FBI and DOJ would arrest individuals who may 
have met the facial statutory requirements of § 3144, but with the ulterior and unconstitutional pur-
pose of investigating or preemptively detaining them, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
Lastly, al-Kidd alleged that Ashcroft designed and implemented polices, or was aware of policies 
and practices that he failed to correct, under which material witnesses were subjected to unreasona-
bly punitive conditions of confinement, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. 
 177. Id. Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity when they engage in activities “intimate-
ly associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 
(1976). They are entitled to qualified immunity only when they perform investigatory functions, 
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Qualified immunity seeks to achieve unique harmony between “two 
important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when 
they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties rea-
sonably.”178 To determine whether a government official is entitled to 
qualified immunity, courts apply a two-prong approach. Courts ask 
whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the in-
jury, the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional 
right, and if so, whether the right was clearly established in light of the 
specific context of the case.179 For a constitutional right to be clearly es-
tablished, its contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.180 Direct, per-
sonal participation is not necessary to establish liability for a constitu-
tional violation.181 
Regarding the first prong, al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated because he alleged specific facts showing that Ashcroft used the 
material witness statute pretextually in order to investigate or preemp-
tively detain suspects without probable cause.182 Regarding the second 
prong, while no case had squarely confronted the issue of whether mi-
suse of the material witness statute to investigate suspects violated the 
Constitution,183 “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates 
established law even in novel factual circumstances.”184 This is so be-
cause “while there may be no published cases holding similar policies 
[un]constitutional, this may be due more to the obviousness of the ille-
gality than the novelty of the legal issue.”185 
                                                                                                             
administrative functions, or are essentially functioning as police officers or detectives. Buckely v. 
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). The United States Attorney General is not entitled to abso-
lute immunity in the performance of his “national security functions.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 
511, 520 (1985). 
 178. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Pearson v. Calla-
han, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009)). 
 179. Al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 964–65 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). 
 180. Id. at 964 (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). 
 181. Id. at 965 (“Supervisors can be held liable for the actions of their subordinates for (1) 
setting in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refusing to terminate a series of acts by 
others, which they knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict constitution-
al injury; (2) for culpable action or inaction in training, supervision, or control of subordinates; (3) 
for acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation by subordinates, or (4) for conduct that shows a 
‘reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.’” (quoting Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 
F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991))). 
 182. See id. at 969. 
 183. Id. at 970. 
 184. Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). 
 185. Id. (quoting Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
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In al-Kidd’s case, no federal appellate court had held that the feder-
al material witness statute satisfied the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment, but the definition of probable cause was clearly estab-
lished.186 Existing case law emphasized that an investigatory program-
matic purpose would invalidate a scheme of searches and seizures with-
out probable cause. Ashcroft thus should have been on sufficient notice 
that the material witness detentions, involving a far more severe seizure 
than a mere traffic stop, would be similarly subject to an inquiry into 
programmatic purpose.187 Therefore, al-Kidd’s right not to be arrested as 
a material witness in order to be investigated or preemptively detained 
was clearly established at the time of his arrest and Ashcroft was, accor-
dingly, not entitled to qualified immunity.188 
B. The Qualified-Immunity Analysis in Padilla v. Yoo 
in Light of Previous Cases 
While the War on Terror raised unprecedented legal questions, the 
crux of the issue presented in Padilla was much narrower—whether, and 
to what extent, a government lawyer should be held liable for his inter-
pretation of law that he knows will be relied and acted upon by others. 
Because American courts historically have answered qualified-immunity 
issues, concerns of lawfare should not be a detriment to those courts 
answering the same qualified-immunity issue presented in Padilla. In 
determining the qualified-immunity question in Padilla, the trial court 
did not consider the national-security context in which the case arose.189 
Rather, the court focused on analyzing case law, including the jurispru-
dence from other circuits and district courts.190 
Like the suits in al-Kidd and other cases, Padilla’s suit targeted an 
individual who did not directly violate Padilla’s constitutional rights by 
physically torturing him. Rather, Padilla alleged specific facts in his 
complaint to satisfy the first prong of the qualified-immunity analysis—
that Yoo set in motion a series of events that resulted in the deprivation 
of Padilla’s constitutional rights.191 Although Yoo was not the sole deci-
sion-maker or solely responsible for implementing detainee policy, he 
                                                 
 186. Id. at 970–71. 
 187. Id. at 971. 
 188. Id. at 973. 
 189. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“[T]he fact that no case has 
found a constitutional violation under the exact facts alleged does not imply that the law is not clear-
ly established.”). 
 190. Id. 
 191. But cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009) (holding that the “bare assertions” 
alleged in the complaint amounted to nothing more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements” of a 
constitutional discrimination claim). 
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was highly influential in creating that policy because he researched and 
interpreted national and international law as applied to Padilla. Like any 
other government official, government lawyers like Yoo are responsible 
for the foreseeable consequences of their conduct.192 For example, in 
Lippoldt v. Cole,193 the court found an assistant city attorney liable where 
she researched the law and drafted a letter denying a protest group’s ap-
plication for a parade permit based on the content of the group’s 
speech.194 Although senior city officials revised the letter, and others ap-
proved and eventually signed the denial of the permit, the court rejected 
the theory that intervening factors cut off causation and instead found 
that the drafting of a legal opinion justifying unconstitutional conduct 
was “a substantial factor” in the decision to deny the parade permits and 
violated the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.195 
Despite the lack of a direct, physical connection to torturing Padilla, 
Yoo violated Padilla’s constitutional rights in three ways. First, Yoo per-
sonally reviewed information pertaining to Padilla and determined that 
Padilla was legally an enemy combatant.196 In addition, Attorney General 
John Ashcroft relied on Yoo’s opinion in recommending to the President 
that Padilla be taken into military custody.197 Finally, Yoo interpreted the 
torture statute “to legally justify pressure techniques proposed by the 
CIA, including waterboarding, mock burial, and open-handed slapping of 
suspects.”198 Thus, because Padilla alleged specifically how Yoo prox-
imately and forseeably violated Padilla’s rights, and did not make “bare 
assertions” that merely recited elements of constitutional violations, Pa-
dilla’s complaint survived the first prong of the qualified-immunity anal-
ysis. 
With respect to the second prong of the qualified-immunity analy-
sis—whether Padilla’s rights were clearly established—the court held 
that designation as an enemy combatant “does not automatically evisce-
rate all of the constitutional protections afforded to a citizen of the Unit-
ed States.”199 The court held that the basic facts alleged in the complaint 
                                                 
 192. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1033. 
 193. Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2006). Defendants did not raise a qualified-
immunity defense on appeal; however, the principle that supports liability is applicable to Padilla. 
 194. See id. at 1210, 1220. 
 195. Id. at 1220. 
 196. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 (citing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint ¶ 38). 
 197. Id. at 1033 (citing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint ¶ 39). 
 198. Id. (citing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint ¶ 28). 
 199. Id. See also, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (“[O]fficials can still be on 
notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances. . . .”); Phillips 
v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the fact that no case has found a con-
stitutional violation under the exact facts alleged does not imply that the law is not clearly estab-
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clearly showed a violation of the rights afforded to citizens held in pris-
on.200 
Yoo argued that courts have never applied the level of constitution-
al rights sought in this action to this unique type of detainee.201 In a qual-
ified-immunity analysis, however, the plaintiff need not establish that the 
defendant’s behavior had been previously declared unconstitutional.202 
Instead, “‘if binding authority indicates that the disputed right existed, 
even if no case had specifically so declared, the [d]efendant[] would be 
on notice of the right.’”203 For example, in Hope v. Pelzer, prison guards 
hitched a prisoner to a post for an extended period of time in a position 
that was painful, and under circumstances that were degrading and dan-
gerous.204 According to the court, the fact that reasonable officers knew 
that handcuffing a prisoner to a fence could constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment should have provided defendants with some notice that 
handcuffing a prisoner to a hitching post violated the plaintiff’s constitu-
tional rights.205 Courts often refer to this line of reasoning as the “com-
mon sense” approach.206 
While no court had previously afforded an enemy combatant the 
kind of constitutional protections that Padilla sought, Padilla’s rights 
were clearly established.207 Merely designating Padilla as an enemy 
combatant does not remove his constitutional rights. Instead, the crucial 
facts were that Padilla is an American citizen, sent from a civilian jail to 
a military brig, detained without charge, deprived of contact with any-
one, unable to practice his religion, and subjected to extreme interroga-
tions.208 Moreover, under the “common sense” approach, Yoo, as an ex-
perienced government attorney, is imputed to have understood the fun-
                                                                                                             
lished); Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a right can be clearly 
established on the basis of common sense in the absence of precedent directly on point). 
 200. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (“The complaint alleges that military agents entered a 
civilian jail, seized a citizen from the civilian justice system, transported him to a military brig, de-
tained him there indefinitely without criminal charge or conviction, deprived him of contact with 
anyone, including attorneys or family, removed the basic ability to practice his religion, and sub-
jected him to a program of extreme interrogations, sensory deprivation and punishment over a period 
of three years and eight months.”). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 1037. 
 203. Id. (quoting Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 204. Hope, 536 U.S. at 734–35 (noting that the prisoner was handcuffed to a hitching post in 
the sun with no shirt for seven hours and was given one or two water breaks but not bathroom 
breaks). 
 205. Id. at 745–46. 
 206. See Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1036. 
 207. Id. at 1037. 
 208. Id. at 1036. 
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damental civil rights afforded to every citizen under the U.S. Constitu-
tion.209 
Even though the legal framework relating to the designation of a 
citizen as an enemy combatant was developed around the same time as 
the conduct alleged in the complaint took place, federal officials were 
cognizant of the fundamental civil rights afforded to detainees under the 
Constitution.210 Padilla properly alleged a violation of his constitutional 
rights, which were clearly established at the time of the conduct. A rea-
sonable federal officer should have believed the conduct was unlawful.211 
Thus, despite the risk of lawfare in this lawsuit, the court correctly re-
jected Yoo’s qualified-immunity defense. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The War on Terror raised unparalleled and extraordinary legal 
questions, such as how to interpret the scope of national and international 
law as applied to American citizens accused of supporting foreign terror-
ists. In writing the memoranda that defined torture policy, national-
security lawyers, like Yoo, confronted two options. In the first option, 
government attorneys could attempt to interpret the law to fit the War on 
Terror, an untraditional war, into the framework of a traditional war, 
where countries are openly hostile to each other and their soldiers wear 
uniforms. Alternatively, the government attorneys had the option to at-
tempt to prevent their interpretations of the law from ever ending up in 
the court system. 
Yoo chose the latter option. By interpreting the torture law narrow-
ly, Yoo attempted to exclude the Judiciary from being involved in deci-
sion-making relating to enemy combatants, even if those enemy comba-
tants are American citizens. Such an exclusion degrades the integrity of 
our government’s structure. 
Yoo, however, continues to support his policy of circumnavigating 
the judiciary.212 After the killing of Osama bin Laden, Yoo stated that the 
                                                 
 209. See id. at 1037. 
 210. Id. See also, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (holding that denial of 
medical attention may result in the infliction of unnecessary suffering which is “inconsistent with 
contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern legislation codifying the common law 
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 211. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1038. 
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killing “vindicated the Bush administration.”213 Although he did not spe-
cifically refer to his memos, Yoo hinted that his strategy for conducting 
interrogations on terrorism suspects, such as 9/11 mastermind Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed at Guantanamo Bay instead of prosecuting him in 
Article III civilian courts, was responsible for the information that even-
tually led to the location of bin Laden.214 
Lawfare is, indeed, a risk in our current litigious world. Often dur-
ing the War on Terror, government agents hesitated to act without ap-
proval by government lawyers.215 Lawfare, however, will continue to be 
a risk if attorneys misconstrue current law in a means-ends analysis. The 
Judiciary correctly decided the case of Padilla v. Yoo despite the poten-
tial use of lawfare by the plaintiff. The Judiciary is a necessary and 
integral part of a democratic government, including on matters that in-
volve national security. The Judiciary’s importance is more pronounced 
in matters solely involving domestic matters. If the Judiciary were cir-
cumvented, plaintiffs similarly situated to Padilla would be without legal 
recourse. Further, in cases like Padilla, where a plaintiff establishes that 
his rights were violated and the defendant government official knew of 
those rights, the qualified-immunity defense should not be available.   
Within the separation-of-powers framework, the Judiciary’s prima-
ry role is to interpret the law set in place by the Legislative and Execu-
tive Branches. While lawfare can be a tactic used by our enemies, it can 
also be the tool through which the Judiciary reviews potentially over-
reaching Legislative and Executive implementations. During this review, 
the Judiciary’s importance, especially in assessing constitutional protec-
tions of American citizens, is at its zenith, and it would be unconsciona-
ble if government officials were permitted to circumvent protections 
provided by the court system. 
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